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more stagnant online compared to offline, which could be due to inefficient exit as a result of lower fixed costs of operation. Having said that, there is also considerable heterogeneity across firms: some experience dramatic growth and become superstars, while others remain dormant with close-to-zero sales for an extended period of time.
Combined, these facts indicate that the e-commerce exporting market may be subject to substantial search and information frictions due to the large number of market participants and significant ex-ante unobserved heterogeneity in quality. These frictions may be more severe than those in the standard offline setting, since international buyers rarely have the opportunity to meet the large number of online sellers in person. Existing platforms try to alleviate such frictions by establishing a rating system and offering sellers various signaling technologies (e.g., sponsored ads and paid keyword searches). However, empirically, it's not clear how well these mechanisms work. Using data collected from Aliexpress, we find consistent evidence for significant initial barriers to growth among small prospective exporters: on average, it takes more than 40 days for the first order to arrive, while subsequent orders arrive much faster. This implies that initial demand shocks could have a persistent impact on growth and performance can be quite path-dependent, resulting in an ambiguous relationship between firm size and quality as described above.
Motivated by by these empirical facts, we then develop a model of e-commerce exporting that embeds both search and information frictions. The latter incorporates both adverse selection and moral hazard. The model helps to explain how the two sides of the market interact in the presence of these frictions, and how these frictions further interact with new exporter growth.
Guided by the theoretical framework, we collect a comprehensive set of firm performance and quality data that allow us to test the model's implications and estimate the extent of search and information frictions in this market. Specifically, using publicly available data, we keep track of the growth and reputation dynamics for a large number of firms of different sizes and at different stages of their lifecycle (age). We combine this information with objective measures of different dimensions of quality, collected through actual purchase (to measure product quality and shipping quality) and direct communication with sellers via the platform (to measure service quality). This allows us to discover the different types of information frictions that exist in this market, and gauge the extent of asymmetric information within each size and age group. Furthermore, the combination of sales and reputation data and objective measures of quality allow us to better understand the nature of asymmetric information in this setting, which remains an important empirical question (Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010) .
Finally, to cleanly identify the initial barriers faced by small prospective exporters and thus understand the emergence of superstars, we further embed a field experiment design into our data collection effort. In particular, among all the small listings within a variety group, we only place a purchase order for a randomly selected subset of them (the treated group); the others serve as the control group. Among the treated sellers, we further vary the content of the review that we give, focusing on different dimensions of quality. The cross-randomization creates two exogenous variations: first, the order treatment generates an initial demand shock for some "lucky" small exporters who are otherwise similar to the control group; second, the review treatment exogenously varies the public information that future buyers would receive. Mapping into our theoretical framework, the former represents a reduction in search costs as sellers with higher sales are typically ranked higher in the organic search results, and the latter represents additional quality signals that could reduce the degree of asymmetric information. Therefore, the difference in post-intervention growth trajectories between the treatment and control groups enables us to identify the impact of search and information frictions in this market, unconfounded by other unobserved supply-side and demand-side factors.
Our preliminary findings suggest that initial random demand shock significantly boost subsequent sales among the treated sellers. However, the effect seems to be very short-run, consistent with substantial search frictions in this market. Information on product quality seems to be matter more compared to information on shipping quality, suggesting that the former may be the major 3 type of asymmetric information between the two sides of the market. We further explore other potential determinants of growth and heterogeneity in treatment effects.
Findings from this study help to shed light on how buyers and exporters interact on the newly arising global e-commerce platforms. Understanding how information frictions and search frictions may hinder the growth of small prospective exporters is also crucial for optimal design of these platforms in order to facilitate more efficient trade. Last but not least, our findings could potentially shed light on the emergence of superstars-in particular, do superstars emerge because of genuine quality advantage or is it largely driven by some initial luck? Answer to this question could also inform other product markets which exhibit the same superstar phenomenon: these include B2C e-commerce platforms (e.g., (Chen and Wu, 2016) ), other digital platforms (e.g., Duch-Brown, Martens, et al. (2014) ), as well as many offline markets (e.g., Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008) ; Freund and Pierola (2015) ). The framework we develop here may be particularly relevant for markets with important search and information frictions.
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows. Section 2 highlight several contributions to existing literatures. Section 3 describes the setting and presents a set of descriptive evidence that motivates the study. Section 4 outlines a theoretical framework that guides the experimental design.
Section 5 describes the sampling procedure, the experimental design and data collection. Section 6 presents our preliminary findings.
Contribution to Literature
Despite the growing importance of e-commerce in international trade, empirical work on this subject remains scarce. Hortaçsu, Martínez-Jerez, and Douglas (2009) examines the geographic patterns of trade using transaction-level data from eBay and MercadoLibre and documents that online trade exhibits the same gravity pattern as traditional offline trade, although to a less extent. In this project, we look beyond cross-country relationships and focus on micro firm-level heterogeneity and withinfirm dynamics. We establish a set of new stylized facts that are distinct to e-commerce exporter dynamics. These facts point to new trade models that may extend the standard heterogeneous firms and trade framework to incorporate important features of the online marketplace.
This project also contributes to the literature on search frictions (Allen, 2014; Eaton, Jinkins, Tybout, and Xu, 2016; Steinwender, 2018) and information frictions in international trade. Our model incorporates both types of frictions, and can be structurally estimated to separately quantify the extent of each. On information frictions, the literature distinguishes between two types of information problems: First, firms may not have enough knowledge about foreign demand or the attractiveness of their products, and would need to learn that through their own export experiences (e.g., Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012) ; Arkolakis, Papageorgiou, and Timoshenko (2017) ). Second, buyers may not perfectly observe the quality of the products at the point of transaction and contract enforcement is imperfect (Startz, 2016) . While the former type of information problem may be alleviated in the online setting as typical e-commerce platforms aggregate and display rich information that allows firms to quickly identify popular products and trends in foreign demand, the latter could well be exacerbated, especially with a large number of sellers and buyers from different parts of the world and most engaging in one-shot transactions (97% in our data). 2 Therefore, in this project, we focus on the demand-side friction and further investigate the types of asymmetric information on product, shipping and/or service quality. Finally, different from the previous studies, which mostly use aggregate trade flow and price data to explore spatial variations (in offline settings), we study how firm growth and quality trajectories interact with these frictions.
Our work also relates to the literature on online reputation mechanism. Tadelis (2016) provides an excellent review of this literature. Many studies have looked at eBay's reputation mechanism. One important feature of our setting, which is common across other large global B2C trading platforms, is that the number of market participants for most product categories is much larger compared to that on eBay. In such an environment, it is not clear how the reputation mechanism is going to work.
Furthermore, given that online reviews are shown to be biased and inflated (Tadelis (2016) ), buyers may end up relying too much on a seller's past transaction history in their search and purchase decisions, which makes "initial luck" more important than it should be. 3 The experiment allows us to directly examine this possibility. 4 Finally, our work speaks to the development literature on micro businesses. A large body of work has studied supply-side interventions, including credit access, managerial trainings, and, in the context of trade and development, various export promotion programs (e.g., Martincus and Carballo (2008); Hui (2016) ). The evidence to date is quite mixed (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013) . 5
More recently, a growing set of work starts to look at demand-side interventions: for example, Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman (2017) study the impact of having access to high-income markets.
Along this line, our work addresses two other important demand-side frictions, namely search and information frictions, conditioning on having relatively easy access to foreign markets.
Setting and Stylized Facts
In this section, we present some basic summary statistics that characterize the market of children's t-shirts on Aliexpress, the subject of the study. We compare and contrast these patterns with what have been documented in traditional offline trade settings. After that, we highlight five stylized facts about the online market that point to the presence of information and search frictions. These empirical patterns guide the structure of the model in Section 4.
Descriptive Patterns of Online Trade
3.1.1 Listing, Variety and Store Characteristics Table 1 to 3 summarize product listing, variety group and store level characteristics using publicly scraped data from Aliexpress in June 2017. As shown in Table 1 , there are close to 20,000 product listings in the category of children's t-shirts; however, more than 40% of the listings have zero sale.
The average price is $10; relative to that, shipping cost is quite low: 70% of the listings offer free shipping and the average shipping price to the US is $0.5.
A unique feature of Aliexpress allows us to group product listings into varieties. A single variety on the same platform as if the platform carries some "group reputation". This force may be particularly salient in context of international trade where the "country of origin" (such as "made-in-China") carries a group reputation (Macchiavello, 2010; Bai, Gazze, and Wang, 2017) . We hope to investigate this channel by keeping track of the same buyer ID's purchasing activities. Large spillovers imply a serious free-riding problem, which provides another rationale for restricting entry and improving screening.
group can contain multiple product listings, sold by different stores, that have exact identical design and observables as they appear to buyers. Table 2 summarizes variety group-level information. On average, a variety group contains two distinct listings. The sales distribution within a variety group appears to be highly concentrated as indicated by the high Herfindahl index. Table 3 presents store-level summary statistics. In total, there are more than 1,800 stores operating in this market. The average revenue (over a period of 6 months) is $2,244 with a standard deviation of $8,335, suggesting a tremendous amount of heterogeneity. In fact, 20% of the stores earned zero revenue over the 6-month period. Most exporters are quite young (average age is 2); many entered in 2017 (age 0), as the platform expands rapidly.
Sorting Patterns
Next, we examine some sorting patterns across stores and variety groups. We contrast these patterns with what have been established in the offline trade setting. In particular, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) (hereafter referred to as EKK) examines the French trade data and documents three stylized facts: (1) the number of French firms selling to a market increases with the market size; (2) sales distributions are similar across markets of different size; (3) average firm performance decreases with market popularity. These findings point to a model of firm heterogeneity and selection into export markets.
In the online setting, there is one "global market" as stores do not target any particular country.
However, stores do make active decisions about which varieties to carry. Thus, we can think of different "varieties" as different product markets, and examine how sorting into different varieties correlates with store performance.
Table 4 documents a positive relationship between variety popularity and the number of stores selling it (Column 1 and 2), consistent with EKK. However, in terms of sales distributions within a variety, we see that while sales in general increases with variety popularity, it increases more for higher performance quantiles (Column 3-5). In other words, sales distribution changes with variety popularity, contrary to EKK where the Pareto shape parameter is stable across markets.
Finally, we look at how entry patterns relate to store characteristics. On average, a store carries 11 varieties; the median is 4. Figure 1 shows that the more popular a variety is (measured in the number of stores selling it), the larger the average store size. This empirical pattern stands in contrast to EKK. One explanation is simply that better (and hence larger) stores are good at picking varieties that meet consumers' taste. A different explanation, however, is that larger stores do not necessarily have higher ability, but their products appear in more salient positions on the platform and thus attract more buyers. To test the two hypotheses, we look at the sequence of entering into a variety and find that superstars are not always the first (i.e., the leader), contrary to what a pure ability story (the first hypothesis) would predict. In fact, the correlation between the order of entry and sales performance is only 0.66 and decreases with variety popularity (Table 5 and 6). These results provide suggestive evidence for the second hypothesis, which in turn implies that a store's performance can be quite path-dependent.
Search and Information Frictions -Five Stylized Facts
We now highlight five stylized facts that point to the presence of search and information frictions in e-commerce trade.
Fact 1: Sales are very concentrated at the top (the "superstars") with a long tail of zero-sale stores. Table 7 summarizes the market shares of top firms in the online and offline markets respectively. 6
Overall, the market share concentration looks quite comparable in the two settings.
Figure 2 plots firm size distributions. We see a big bunching at zero for the online market (as shown in Table 3 ). Excluding these zero-sale stores, online performance looks more tightly distributed than offline performance. The Pareto slope, shown in Figure 3 , is more negative, indicating a thicker right tail and smaller size gap. All together, these patterns suggest that there could be some initial hurdle to growth, but after that, performance is more equalized across firms.
Fact 2: Superstars do not seem to command any significant quality advantage compared to small sellers in the same variety group.
As seen from Table 2 , performance varies significantly across identical-looking product listings within the same variety group: a typical group features a superstar seller that captures most of the sales and a number of very small or zero-sale listings. A natural question that arises is whether superstars provide any genuine quality premium. To answer this question, we purchased t-shirts from a randomly selected sample of superstars and zero-sale sellers from the same variety groups, 6 For the offline market, we use the Chinese Customs data and identify the corresponding HS product category. 8 and measured service, shipping and product quality. Interestingly, we do not find any significant quality advantage of the superstars; if anything, product quality (in terms of materials) and service quality (in terms of English proficiency and responsiveness to email inquiries) of the superstars appear to be lower. The only slight advantage that superstars seem to have is shipping speed: on average, the orders arrived in 18 days, 3 days faster than the orders from the small sellers.
These findings raise a further question: how do superstars emerge in this kind of market environment? One possibility, consistent with the empirical evidence above, is that initial demand shocks, uncorrelated with underlying quality, may play an important role. Our experiment directly tests this possibility. Next, we document two additional stylized facts related to growth dynamics.
Fact 3:
The lifecycle growth trajectory looks more stagnant online compared to offline.
To examine growth dynamics, we look at how cumulative sales changes as firms age. We define age to be the number of years since a firm is registered on Aliexpress. Figure 4 shows that, a 3-year old store on e-commerce is only 20% larger than a newborn store; on the other hand, a 3-year old offline exporter is 1.5 times larger than its newborn counterparts. The same pattern holds when we look at sales in a single segment (children's t-shirts) as well as aggregate sales over all segments.
Several forces may underlie the differential growth trajectories. First, firm turnover may be much slower online compared to offline due to the relatively low costs of operating a business on e-commerce. This would lead to inefficient exit. Second, within-firm growth may be slower online compared to offline, perhaps due to competition beyond some initial scale (consistent with Fact 1 ).
Third, there may be underlying cohort effect that are difficult to disentangle from the lifecycle effect.
Fact 4: On average, it takes more than 40 days for the first order to arrive; however, after that, subsequent orders arrive much faster, suggesting some significant initial barriers to growth.
Using transaction-level data over a period of 6 months, we examine the dynamics of orders and how long they take to arrive. Figure 5 plots the number of days it takes to receive the n-th order for stores of different size (measured at the end of the period). We see a striking pattern: even for the most (ex-post) "successful" stores, it takes more than 40 days for the first order to arrive; however, conditioning on having one order, subsequent orders arrive much faster. This pattern is robust across all size categories: the lines shift upwards as we move to less successful stores (selection effect), but they all remain highly concave.
This pattern provides suggestive evidence for substantial initial barriers to growth (consistent 9 with Fact 1 ). However, one important confounding factor is unobserved supply-side action: for example, it could be that after some initial period of preparation, sellers start to invest in some costly actions, such as purchasing keywords and search ranks, which are unobserved by researchers but help to boost sales. From observational data, it is difficult to tease apart these competing hypotheses. Our experiment, which generates exogenous initial demand shocks, allows us to isolate the demand-side friction from the supply-side story.
Fact 5: Existing rating system may not signal quality very well due to missing and inflation issues.
Of all the 1,900 product listings that have made some sales from January to June 2017, 1,079
have not received any review (57%). For the 821 listings that have received some review, 714 (87%) received the full rating of 1. Furthermore, we find that the number of reviews (good and bad) as a fraction of the total number of orders is negatively correlated with the feedback score. This is in line with previous findings in the literature that "no news is bad news" (Tadelis, 2016) . Figure 6 plots the distribution of sales by score of the very first review. Interestingly, we see that compared to no review, having the first review matters; however, it matters regardless of whether the first review is 1 or below 1. This suggests that the current rating system may not provide enough information to buyers to be able to accurately infer quality. In the experiment, we go beyond the simple numerical rating, and provide richer information on shipping reliability and product quality.
Taken together, these stylize facts point to the presence of search and information frictions on the existing platform, which could hinder firm growth and result in a superstar phenomenon that is not based on genuine quality advantage. Next, we develop a model that explicitly incorporates the two types of frictions to account for these empirical patterns. The model guides the experimental design and can be structurally estimated to quantify the size of these frictions.
Theoretical Framework
We focus on a single product segment (e.g., children's t-shirts). Suppose that the platform features an infinite (continuum) number of sellers and buyers, of measure 1 and M respectively. Sellers are born with two types, High type and Low type, and set price and quality in each period to maximize discounted sum of future profits. Quality is determined by both type and effort, so the model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. Buyers do not directly observe quality at the point of transaction but observe an imperfect signal based on past reviews and update beliefs.
In a given period, buyers conduct a non-sequential search and randomly sample a set of sellers of different size and review history. Importantly, we allow the search cost to be lower for larger sellers, reflecting the fact that products sold by larger stores are positioned more saliently on the platform.
Finally, we assume away repeated interaction between the same buyer and seller. 7 We describe below how forward-looking sellers, of different type and at different stages of the lifecycle, endogenous choose the optimal price and quality (effort) given the buyer search and learning behavior. The model delivers predictions on the life-cycle dynamics of growth and quality that can be brought to the data.
Demand Side

Search and purchase:
To model the search problem, we adapt a non-sequential search framework to our setting. In any given period, consumers randomly sample N sellers, where N is exogenously given. 8 We assume that the probability of being sampled, denoted as φ(q) ∈ (0, 1), is larger for larger sellers (i.e., φ(q) increases with q, where q is the total number of past orders of a given seller). This is a simple way of representing a search problem, but captures the key force that the search cost is lower for larger, and thus higher-ranked, stores.
Among all the sellers that buyer l samples, the utility of buying from seller i takes the following form:
v i denotes the perceived quality, which takes value of 1 (Good) or 0 (Bad); p i denotes the price charged; α is the coefficient on price; ∼ F () represents some idiosyncratic preference shock (e.g., the match value between buyer l and seller i). Buyer picks i with the highest expected utility (due to uncertainty aroundṽ i ).
Prior beliefs, learning and posterior perceived qualityṽ i :
Before inspecting a product, buyers have some prior beliefs about quality, which are consistent with sellers' strategy that is described below. Suppose prior beliefs follow a Beta distribution β(a 0 , b 0 ), where a 0 can be interpreted as the number of prior good experiences and b 0 can be interpreted as the number of prior bad experiences. In principle, prior beliefs could depend on the observed size of the seller (q); we abbreviate the notation here. Upon clicking on the product listing and inspecting the review history, the buyer updates her beliefs in a Bayesian fashion: after observing n positive reviews (e.g., 4 stars and above) and s negative reviews (3 stars and below), the buyer's posterior beliefs aboutṽ i follow β(a 0 + n, b 0 + s). 9 The posterior mean is a 0 +n a 0 +b 0 +n+s , and the posterior variance is (a 0 +n)(b 0 +s) (a 0 +b 0 +n+s) 2 (a 0 +b 0 +n+s+1) .
Review behavior:
Finally, after receiving the product, a buyer can choose whether to leave a review or not. Let v il denote the true quality of the product buyer l receives, either Good (1) or Bad (0)-the probability of which is determined by seller's type and effort (see below). Writing a review incurs some positive cost ζ l ∼ F ζ , and we assume that the buyer would only write it if the experience is very positive or very negative relative to some average expected quality. Specifically, the buyer chooses to leave the review iff (v il − v) 2 − ζ l > 0. The review is positive if v il = 1, and negative if v il = 0.
Supply Side
Hidden type and hidden action Consider the marketplace with a unit continuum of sellers, each of which can be of two types: θ ∈ {High-quality (H), Low-quality (L)}, with probability µ and 1 − µ. µ indicates the extent of the lemons problem in this market.
The quality of the base product sold by the two types are H and L respectively, where 1 > H > L > 0. Quality is operationalized as the probability of supplying Good product. In addition, sellers can exert some effort e ∈ [e, e] to improve the quality by e at some cost g(e), which is differentiable, increasing and convex. Therefore, quality v i in a given period is good with probability H + e if the seller is a High type and L + e if the seller is a Low type. We assume H + e ≤ 1.
Dynamic optimization over the lifecycle 9 The Beta distribution is a conjugate prior for Bernoulli likelihood.
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The seller's state variables are given by the triplet: (n, s, q), where n and s indicate the number of good and bad past reviews, and q indicates the number of past orders. In each period, sellers (of each type) chooses the optimal price (p) and effort (e) to maximize the discounted sum of future profits, with a common discount factor δ.
Since each seller is atomistic, it takes the other sellers' behavior as given. We can write the value function as follows:
where Π indicates current period profits; m(q) is the mass of buyers a seller of size q could attract in a period, which depends on the mass of consumers and the search technology described above.
Discussion
The model highlights three channels in which current size (q) could influence future growth: (1) larger q implies higher φ(q) (i.e., lower search costs); (2) q may influence consumers' prior beliefs about quality, consistent with equilibrium distribution of quality in each size group; (3) to the extent that the number of past reviews (n and s) positively correlates with q, q also affects the precision of the signal and hence the degree of belief updating. To address the different channels, we experimentally vary q through randomized initial orders. We then keep track of a product's page rank after the intervention (channel 1), measure the quality distribution for different size groups (channel 2), and exploit natural (non-experimental) variations in the number of past reviews conditioning on size and other observables (channel 3) to shed light on the three channels.
The impact of q on seller's reputational incentive (i.e., the optimal choice of e * θ ) is theoretically ambiguous: on one hand, larger q attracts larger flow of buyers, which increases the damage of shirking; on the other hand, additional signals, good or bad, shift posterior beliefs less for sellers with an existing large number of past reviews. Empirically, we collect a rich set of quality metrics to examine how sellers' incentive to provide quality changes over the lifecycle.
Finally, the experiment also introduces exogenous variations in n and s. This allows us to examine how buyers' purchase patterns change after additional signals (information) about quality, directly speaking to the learning mechanism. We further vary the content of the review to shed light 13 on what types of asymmetric information may exist between the two sides of the market.
The next section describes the experimental design and data collection.
Data and Experimental Design
The research is conducted on Aliexpress, the world leading global B2C e-commerce platform owned by Alibaba. We focus on stores selling children's t-shirts, which is one of the most popular product categories transacted on the platform.
The study proceeds in three steps, which we describe in detail below:
Step 1: Baseline census and sampling strategy
Step 2: Randomization and intervention
Step 3: Data collection
Baseline Census and Sampling Strategy
There are about 2000 stores selling children's t-shirts on Aliexpress. We have scraped publicly available data on stores' basic information (date of opening and location) as well as information about all of their product listings. In particular, for each product listing by a store, we observe the page rank, price (before and after discount), past sales, rating, shipping policy, return policy, and product details (including materials, size options, word descriptions, pictures, etc). For each listing, we also observe a full 6-month transaction and feedback history.
As discussed above, we can group the product listings into variety groups-multiple stores may be selling the same variety of identical design and observables. In total, there are 4,640 distinct varieties, of which 864 are sold by more than one store. Among these 864 varieties, we focus on varieties with more than 100 orders, aggregated across all stores, and with at least two small stores selling it, defined as stores with fewer than 5 orders. This screening procedure aims to achieve two goals: first, it selects varieties with enough size variation across sellers, and this allows us to examine interesting life-cycle dynamics; second, it allows us to create a treatment and control group of "identical" small sellers selling the same product.
In total, we have 133 varieties satisfying the above criteria, containing 1,265 product listings. For listings in T1, we place 3 t-shirt orders and leave a star rating. Listings in T2 and T3 receive the same positive demand shock but different reviews, in addition to the star rating: for listings in T2, we leave a detailed review on shipping quality; for listings in T3, we leave a detailed review on product quality. We make two remarks regarding the review treatments:
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Randomization and Intervention
Remark 1: Rating is highly inflated on Aliexpress: out of the 737,000+ reviews we observe over a 6-month window, 87% involve five stars. Given this, we give a five-star rating to the order unless there is any obvious quality defect or shipping issue. processing to analyze past reviews left by buyers to tease out the key words. Appendix A.1 describes the reviews in detail.
In order to allow for comparison across otherwise "identical" sellers, we stratify the randomization by variety group:
1. For varieties sold by 2 small sellers (and other big sellers), we assign half to control and half to treatment. The latter is split equally between T1 and T2+T3.
2. For varieties sold by more than 2 small sellers (and other big sellers), we assign 1/3 to control, 1/3 to T1, and 1/3 to T2+T3, within each variety group 3. Finally, we split T2+T3 equally between T2 and T3
In sum, our experiment sample consists of 487 (small) product listings distributed in 4 groups: 303 in C, 259 in T1, 114 in T2 and 114 in T3.
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Data Collection
Growth dynamics and entry. We keep track of all the listings in the 133 variety groups (including new entrants as well) for 4 months after the intervention, collecting information on page ranking, sales, price, and rating on a weekly frequency. For all the 638 stores carrying one or more of the 133 varieties, we further keep track of the store-level dynamics, including sales (for all products the store carries), ratings, prices, and changes in product portfolio (e.g., new arrivials).
Quality. In order to gauge the extent of information frictions in this market and examine the lifecycle dynamics of growth and quality, we collect a rich set of quality measures across different size groups. Specifically, for all the small listings in the three treatment groups, medium listings with sales between 6 and 50 (233), and superstar listings (largest) in all the 133 variety groups, we collect information on service quality, shipping quality and product quality via (1) direct communication with the sellers, and (2) actual purchase of the products:
• Service Quality. We visit the homepage of each store and send a message via the platform to request pre-purchase service (i.e., inquire about a particular product). We elicit service quality based on whether the message is replied, whether our questions are acknowledged and addressed, as well as the English proficiency of the seller. See Appendix A.2 for details.
• Shipping Quality. We record the date of purchase, the date of shipment, the date of delivery, carrier name, and the condition of package to measure shipping quality.
• Product Quality. We invite people from local consignment stores to inspect and grade the quality of each purchased t-shirts on the following aspects: fabrics, seams, tailoring, lining and details (e.g., buttons and zippers). This is still work in progress. For the results below, we use a crude measure of quality based on an initial inspection.
Results
Among all the 1265 listings in the 133 variety groups, we placed an order for 826 listings, covering small, medium and large baseline size groups. 772 of the orders were successfully delivered, and for which we observe the various dimensions of quality. Our experimental sample consists of 790 small listings; 487 are assigned to treatments for which an order and/or a review is made. 10 We first examine the correlation between quality and baseline performance using data collected from the 772 listings. The results shed light on the extent of information frictions and how it varies across size groups. After that, we turn to the treatment effects of the first order and review on small listings. Figure 7 shows the scatter plot of various shipping and service quality on baseline orders. We measure shipping quality using two proxies: (a) the time lag (days) between an order is placed and the package is shipped out, and (b) the time lag (days) between the order is shipping out and received by us. Service quality is measured as the time lag (hours) between the inquiry message is sent and a seller responds to the message. Overall, we see significant variations in quality and very noisy relationships between quality and baseline performance measured in sales. Table 8 shows the regression results, with and without conditioning on variety group fixed effect.
Quality and Performance
We see that baseline performance does not predict quality. These suggest that growth is, to some extent, random and existing mechanisms on the platform may not fully reveal underlying quality.
One possibility is that even though average quality does not change with size, quality dispersion may be smaller in larger size groups. Therefore, there is less uncertainty faced by consumers if they purchase from large sellers. To examine how dispersion changes with size, we divide the sample into large (above median) and small (below median) size groups and calculate the coefficient of variation (std/mean) for each size group. The evidence, shown in Table 9 , is again quite mixed.
These results confirm the stylized fact documented in Section 3 that large sellers do not necessarily command any quality advantage to small sellers. Search and information frictions may play an important role in explaining the observed performance differences. The next question is, then, who gets to grow and why? Our experimental results speak to this question.
Treatment Effects of the First Order and Review
Now we turn to our experimental sample. We define a treatment indicator T which equals to 1 if a listing received an order regardless of the review treatment. Figure 8 plots the distribution of 10 Note: 19 of the 487 planned orders were not made because the listings became unavailable at the point of purchase.
net sales (subtracting our own order) 3 months after the intervention for the control and treatment groups. We see a small shift to the right among the treated listings, especially from the 0 to 1 margin. Overall, most listings remain small except for a few outliers that managed to grow.
Next, we estimate the following regression:
where the dependent variable is the total number of sales (excluding our order) for listing i in week t. T2 and T3 are indicators for shipping quality review and product quality reviews, respectively.
Week 1 stands for the first week after the order treatment. PostReview is a dummy that equals to 1 after week 7 (when we left the reviews for orders in T2 and T4). λ t and ν g(i) represents week and group fixed effects. In addition, all regressions control for baseline price and sales (at the store level and listing level).
The results are shown in Table 10 . We see that the order treatment has a positive effect on sales, and the effect is significant for sales to English countries, in particular, to the US. Interestingly, the effects of the review treatments hinge on the specific content: information on product quality has a significant positive effect on sales, whereas information on shipping quality does not seem to matter. Table 10 fully interacts the various treatment dummies with week dummies to examines the impact over time. We see that the order effect concentrates in the first week and decays quickly afterwards. This indicates significant search frictions in this market and one order is not enough to overcome the initial growth barriers.
Finally, Table 12 examines how growth correlates with quality and other baseline characteristicsif the one-time random demand shock does not induce persistent divergence in growth, what could have determined the different growth outcomes seen in Figure 8 ? Again, consistent with Table 8 , we see that quality does not seem to predict growth, whereas lower price is associated with higher growth (this could be driven by other unobserved actions the sellers take).
Next Steps
Moving forward, we would like to first investigate the underlying mechanisms for the short-term impact on sales. One hypothesis is that boosting sales from 0 to 1 helps to boost ranking and visibility, and thereby reduces search costs. We plan to examine this using the high-frequency ranking data collected from all listings in this market. Second, the effects of treatments may be heterogeneous across sellers with different quality: does random demand shocks and information facilitate the growth of high-quality sellers more? Finally, we hope to investigate how other productlevel and store-level outcomes, such as pricing, introduction of new products and penetration into foreign markets, evolve as a seller grows. Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Note: Observation is at group-store level. Column (1) include all groups; column 2-6 include groups with different popularity (proxied by group revenue). Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Age FE Note: Observation is at group-store level. Column (1) include all groups; column 2-6 include groups with different popularity (proxied by group revenue). Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Note: Unit: 1000 RMB for the online market and million USD for the offline market. Note: For lnsales, we replace 0 with 0.0001 and add a dummy for zero sales. Rating is defined conditioning on positive order (at baseline). Most missing values in rating are due to zero sales. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. No review First review<1
Note: Spell is defined to be the total number of orders received during the 6-month period. 
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